Value of Evolutionary Approaches
14/07/11 20:57 Filed in: Human Nature
My recent posts on the evolution or responsibility (one, two, and three) might make it seem that I think evolutionary approaches to human nature lack any justification or philosophical insight. Quite the opposite, in fact I think Darwin's own insights about human nature and human morality are on target, and I've praised Mary Midgley's work in the philosophy of human nature (for example, here). Even if we limit ourselves to a discussion of the value of evolutionary psychology I am not sure I am willing simply to dismiss everything concerning EP. For one, how one understands EP remains an open question.
One of the more lucid critics of EP, David Buller, makes this point well. Buller notes that one of the more frustrating aspects of the debates concerning EP consists in the fact that supporters and critics often talk past one another because they fail to reach an agreement on exactly what they are talking about. Sometimes, for instance, the term "evolutionary psychology" is "used simply as a shorthand for 'the evolutionary study of mind and behavior' or as a shorthand for theories 'adapting an evolutionary perspective on human behavior and psychology'" (8). If we limit the term EP to mean one of these two things, then I find it irrational not to be an evolutionary psychologist in the modern period if one is seriously writing about human nature. In fact, one of the motivations I have for writing a book on human nature lies in the fact that people writing in science take no notice of what has been written by Aristotelians and Thomists about human nature, and, conversely, Aristotelians and Thomists take no notice of what is written from an evolutionary perspective. Something must be done to correct this lack of dialogue and bring the two paradigms into conversation with each other. Moreover, from my perspective, the Aristotelians and Thomists here prove more at fault, for it is essential to an Aristotelian approach (and Thomas was an Aristotelian, which is why his writings were condemned for some time after his death) to incorporate the findings of science because Aristotle was (a) an empiricist and (b) a scientist. We cannot, then, understand human nature -- what human beings are - without understanding that they are primarily animals -- animals of a specific nature - a rational nature - but still animals. Thomas states that human beings exist at the top of the ladder of animals and at the bottom of the ladder of spiritual beings because they are embodied spirits. The second reason for writing a book on human nature consists in the fact that modern Cartesian dualism has led us to a severe misunderstanding of the human being and, thus, to the modern reductionist materialism that characterizes much of the science today.
Which brings me to the second understanding of "evolutionary psychology." This more limited sense is that shared by Richard Dawkins, Leda Cosmides, John Toody, Steven Pinker, David Buss, Janet Radcliffe Richards, and Richard Wright. It includes research "conducted within a specific set of theoretical and methodological commitments" (8). Briefly, these theoretical commitments include the idea that psychological mechanisms (e.g., motivational mechanisms in the brain) formed through natural selection during the Pleistocene era (1.2 mya - 10 kya) when our ancestors (other hominids and cro-magnons) evovled on and spread out from the savannas of Africa. Further, these psychological mechanisms are ill-suited for modern living because the conditions of the African savannas differ considerably and present different adaptive problems than our current agricultural-cum-urban living environment. The methodological commitment concerns the reverse engineering that EP theorists engage in to determine the function of these psychological mechanisms. If they discover a psychological mechanism that appears culturally universal, they have reason to believe that such a psychological mechanism is part of human nature and, thus, arose during the Pleistocene period. In order to determine the function of that mechanism, EP theorists engage in conjectures about what adapted problems early hominids faced that would explain the adaptive value of the psychological mechanism in question. So, if one wanted ot understand why human males philander, one wonders what sort of conditions would make human male philandering a successful strategy for the spread of one's genes (for, essentially, human beings, like all other living organisms, are mere survival machines for the spread of genes).
Concerning this more limited understanding of EP, I have many qualms, some that Buller articulates quite well and others Paul R. Ehrlich articulates. Primarily though, reading a book like Dawkins' The Selfish Gene, I find it difficult to stomach the sort of conjecturing to explain how such and such a psychological mechanism could have arisen, because in fact (1) we do not know the specific conditions within which those mechanisms developed, (b) nor do we know the "rival" mechanisms against which the ones that succeeded competed and proved more successful, (c) nor do we have a clear understanding of how the relationships between genes that give rise to the phenotypes that underly these psychological mechanisms make some mechanisms more successful, not because they are singularly more successful, but because, through an accident of nature, it just tends to be tied to some other structure that is overwhelmingly more successful. (If, for example, I have the two highest trump cards in Euchre, regardless of the rest of my hand, I am more likely to win than not ceteris paribus.)
Further, given our extended life-time relative to our ancestors, we may have many psychological mechanisms that evolved that did not increase reproductive success. Depression and manic-depression (bi-polar disorder), for instance, are disorders that arise sometime after menstruation and even in the early 20's that would have had little to no impact on reproductive success. If we can think of negative psychological mechanisms like these, we ought to be able to uncover positive ones that maybe had no impact on human reproductive success. Finally, EP theorists resist the claim that some of our psychological mechanisms could have evolved since the development of agriculture. They wish to explain everything in terms of differential reproductive success during the Pleistocene era. I think this too limited an approach.
Still, I do not want simply to dismiss this more limited understanding of EP. Certainly some of our psychological mechanisms can be understood well in this manner, though not all. The problem is that people like Dawkins and Pinker believe that all psychology can be reduced, one day, to this more limited approach. That comprises one form of reductivism that must be resisted in the more limited understanding of EP.
Still, the value of an evolutionary approach to human nature should not be undervalued. An understanding of our psychological/motivational structures can help us to understand the particular needs that define the lives of homo sapiens. It is specifically those needs that a critical philosophical anthropology seeks to uncover to make a better life for everyone. Thus, I share with Robert Wright the goal of making life better through an understanding of human nature. I reject, however, the idea that this understanding can come completely from evolution.
One of the more lucid critics of EP, David Buller, makes this point well. Buller notes that one of the more frustrating aspects of the debates concerning EP consists in the fact that supporters and critics often talk past one another because they fail to reach an agreement on exactly what they are talking about. Sometimes, for instance, the term "evolutionary psychology" is "used simply as a shorthand for 'the evolutionary study of mind and behavior' or as a shorthand for theories 'adapting an evolutionary perspective on human behavior and psychology'" (8). If we limit the term EP to mean one of these two things, then I find it irrational not to be an evolutionary psychologist in the modern period if one is seriously writing about human nature. In fact, one of the motivations I have for writing a book on human nature lies in the fact that people writing in science take no notice of what has been written by Aristotelians and Thomists about human nature, and, conversely, Aristotelians and Thomists take no notice of what is written from an evolutionary perspective. Something must be done to correct this lack of dialogue and bring the two paradigms into conversation with each other. Moreover, from my perspective, the Aristotelians and Thomists here prove more at fault, for it is essential to an Aristotelian approach (and Thomas was an Aristotelian, which is why his writings were condemned for some time after his death) to incorporate the findings of science because Aristotle was (a) an empiricist and (b) a scientist. We cannot, then, understand human nature -- what human beings are - without understanding that they are primarily animals -- animals of a specific nature - a rational nature - but still animals. Thomas states that human beings exist at the top of the ladder of animals and at the bottom of the ladder of spiritual beings because they are embodied spirits. The second reason for writing a book on human nature consists in the fact that modern Cartesian dualism has led us to a severe misunderstanding of the human being and, thus, to the modern reductionist materialism that characterizes much of the science today.
Which brings me to the second understanding of "evolutionary psychology." This more limited sense is that shared by Richard Dawkins, Leda Cosmides, John Toody, Steven Pinker, David Buss, Janet Radcliffe Richards, and Richard Wright. It includes research "conducted within a specific set of theoretical and methodological commitments" (8). Briefly, these theoretical commitments include the idea that psychological mechanisms (e.g., motivational mechanisms in the brain) formed through natural selection during the Pleistocene era (1.2 mya - 10 kya) when our ancestors (other hominids and cro-magnons) evovled on and spread out from the savannas of Africa. Further, these psychological mechanisms are ill-suited for modern living because the conditions of the African savannas differ considerably and present different adaptive problems than our current agricultural-cum-urban living environment. The methodological commitment concerns the reverse engineering that EP theorists engage in to determine the function of these psychological mechanisms. If they discover a psychological mechanism that appears culturally universal, they have reason to believe that such a psychological mechanism is part of human nature and, thus, arose during the Pleistocene period. In order to determine the function of that mechanism, EP theorists engage in conjectures about what adapted problems early hominids faced that would explain the adaptive value of the psychological mechanism in question. So, if one wanted ot understand why human males philander, one wonders what sort of conditions would make human male philandering a successful strategy for the spread of one's genes (for, essentially, human beings, like all other living organisms, are mere survival machines for the spread of genes).
Concerning this more limited understanding of EP, I have many qualms, some that Buller articulates quite well and others Paul R. Ehrlich articulates. Primarily though, reading a book like Dawkins' The Selfish Gene, I find it difficult to stomach the sort of conjecturing to explain how such and such a psychological mechanism could have arisen, because in fact (1) we do not know the specific conditions within which those mechanisms developed, (b) nor do we know the "rival" mechanisms against which the ones that succeeded competed and proved more successful, (c) nor do we have a clear understanding of how the relationships between genes that give rise to the phenotypes that underly these psychological mechanisms make some mechanisms more successful, not because they are singularly more successful, but because, through an accident of nature, it just tends to be tied to some other structure that is overwhelmingly more successful. (If, for example, I have the two highest trump cards in Euchre, regardless of the rest of my hand, I am more likely to win than not ceteris paribus.)
Further, given our extended life-time relative to our ancestors, we may have many psychological mechanisms that evolved that did not increase reproductive success. Depression and manic-depression (bi-polar disorder), for instance, are disorders that arise sometime after menstruation and even in the early 20's that would have had little to no impact on reproductive success. If we can think of negative psychological mechanisms like these, we ought to be able to uncover positive ones that maybe had no impact on human reproductive success. Finally, EP theorists resist the claim that some of our psychological mechanisms could have evolved since the development of agriculture. They wish to explain everything in terms of differential reproductive success during the Pleistocene era. I think this too limited an approach.
Still, I do not want simply to dismiss this more limited understanding of EP. Certainly some of our psychological mechanisms can be understood well in this manner, though not all. The problem is that people like Dawkins and Pinker believe that all psychology can be reduced, one day, to this more limited approach. That comprises one form of reductivism that must be resisted in the more limited understanding of EP.
Still, the value of an evolutionary approach to human nature should not be undervalued. An understanding of our psychological/motivational structures can help us to understand the particular needs that define the lives of homo sapiens. It is specifically those needs that a critical philosophical anthropology seeks to uncover to make a better life for everyone. Thus, I share with Robert Wright the goal of making life better through an understanding of human nature. I reject, however, the idea that this understanding can come completely from evolution.
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