Jencks on Genes, Cultures, Freedom
16/12/10 21:06 Filed in: Human Nature
Jencks, in his article, EP, Phone Home, takes on the nature versus nurture, or gene versus culture, debate and, in particular, the claims of evolutionary psychology. In particular, for Jencks, evolutionary psychology claims that human behavior can be explained by reference to “epigenetic rules” programmed in our genes some half a million years ago, when hominids first walked the steppes of Africa. Jencks main complaint against evolutionary psychology is that EP is unable to account for human freedom.
We can look at, for instance, sneezing, sex, and art. Sneezing is more biological determined than is sex, but each allow a modicum of freedom. For example, how someone sneezes or what they say when they sneeze, or, with sex, the various positions or approaches to sex that vary from culture to culture. Art, however, seems to comprise an arena in which human beings actualize maximum freedom, because good art defies rules. Jencks attacks, in particular, E. O. Wilson’s account of beauty as an expression of epigenetic rules that map out how human beings respond to certain levels of complexity and repetition in a piece of art work or in nature.
While I think that Jencks article lacks a detailed argument, surely he is on the right track here. In particular, Jencks emphasizes what other theorists have said before, especially Mary Midgley and Alasdair MacIntyre, both of whom have, in my opinion, a fairly Aristotelian approach. We cannot reduce discussions of human nature to the either/or dichotomies that have framed the debate about human nature in the West for millennia. In fact, a frank look at culture and biology show that nature and nurture cannot be the only answer to human behavior, though they provide the foundation for human freedom. Or, I should say, that nature and nurture -- genes and culture -- provide the conditions within which human beings, and other pre-linguistic rational animals -- exercise what Thomas Aquinas calls free choice.
Understanding this relationship proves essential for addressing the claims of determinists, on the one side, social constructivists, on the other, and existentialist on the third.
We can look at, for instance, sneezing, sex, and art. Sneezing is more biological determined than is sex, but each allow a modicum of freedom. For example, how someone sneezes or what they say when they sneeze, or, with sex, the various positions or approaches to sex that vary from culture to culture. Art, however, seems to comprise an arena in which human beings actualize maximum freedom, because good art defies rules. Jencks attacks, in particular, E. O. Wilson’s account of beauty as an expression of epigenetic rules that map out how human beings respond to certain levels of complexity and repetition in a piece of art work or in nature.
While I think that Jencks article lacks a detailed argument, surely he is on the right track here. In particular, Jencks emphasizes what other theorists have said before, especially Mary Midgley and Alasdair MacIntyre, both of whom have, in my opinion, a fairly Aristotelian approach. We cannot reduce discussions of human nature to the either/or dichotomies that have framed the debate about human nature in the West for millennia. In fact, a frank look at culture and biology show that nature and nurture cannot be the only answer to human behavior, though they provide the foundation for human freedom. Or, I should say, that nature and nurture -- genes and culture -- provide the conditions within which human beings, and other pre-linguistic rational animals -- exercise what Thomas Aquinas calls free choice.
Understanding this relationship proves essential for addressing the claims of determinists, on the one side, social constructivists, on the other, and existentialist on the third.
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