Value of Evolutionary Approaches
14/07/11 20:57 Filed in: Human Nature
My recent posts on the evolution or responsibility (one, two, and three) might make it seem that I think evolutionary approaches to human nature lack any justification or philosophical insight. Quite the opposite, in fact I think Darwin's own insights about human nature and human morality are on target, and I've praised Mary Midgley's work in the philosophy of human nature (for example, here). Even if we limit ourselves to a discussion of the value of evolutionary psychology I am not sure I am willing simply to dismiss everything concerning EP. For one, how one understands EP remains an open question.
One of the more lucid critics of EP, David Buller, makes this point well. Buller notes that one of the more frustrating aspects of the debates concerning EP consists in the fact that supporters and critics often talk past one another because they fail to reach an agreement on exactly what they are talking about. Sometimes, for instance, the term "evolutionary psychology" is "used simply as a shorthand for 'the evolutionary study of mind and behavior' or as a shorthand for theories 'adapting an evolutionary perspective on human behavior and psychology'" (8). If we limit the term EP to mean one of these two things, then I find it irrational not to be an evolutionary psychologist in the modern period if one is seriously writing about human nature. In fact, one of the motivations I have for writing a book on human nature lies in the fact that people writing in science take no notice of what has been written by Aristotelians and Thomists about human nature, and, conversely, Aristotelians and Thomists take no notice of what is written from an evolutionary perspective. Something must be done to correct this lack of dialogue and bring the two paradigms into conversation with each other. Moreover, from my perspective, the Aristotelians and Thomists here prove more at fault, for it is essential to an Aristotelian approach (and Thomas was an Aristotelian, which is why his writings were condemned for some time after his death) to incorporate the findings of science because Aristotle was (a) an empiricist and (b) a scientist. We cannot, then, understand human nature -- what human beings are - without understanding that they are primarily animals -- animals of a specific nature - a rational nature - but still animals. Thomas states that human beings exist at the top of the ladder of animals and at the bottom of the ladder of spiritual beings because they are embodied spirits. The second reason for writing a book on human nature consists in the fact that modern Cartesian dualism has led us to a severe misunderstanding of the human being and, thus, to the modern reductionist materialism that characterizes much of the science today.
Which brings me to the second understanding of "evolutionary psychology." This more limited sense is that shared by Richard Dawkins, Leda Cosmides, John Toody, Steven Pinker, David Buss, Janet Radcliffe Richards, and Richard Wright. It includes research "conducted within a specific set of theoretical and methodological commitments" (8). Briefly, these theoretical commitments include the idea that psychological mechanisms (e.g., motivational mechanisms in the brain) formed through natural selection during the Pleistocene era (1.2 mya - 10 kya) when our ancestors (other hominids and cro-magnons) evovled on and spread out from the savannas of Africa. Further, these psychological mechanisms are ill-suited for modern living because the conditions of the African savannas differ considerably and present different adaptive problems than our current agricultural-cum-urban living environment. The methodological commitment concerns the reverse engineering that EP theorists engage in to determine the function of these psychological mechanisms. If they discover a psychological mechanism that appears culturally universal, they have reason to believe that such a psychological mechanism is part of human nature and, thus, arose during the Pleistocene period. In order to determine the function of that mechanism, EP theorists engage in conjectures about what adapted problems early hominids faced that would explain the adaptive value of the psychological mechanism in question. So, if one wanted ot understand why human males philander, one wonders what sort of conditions would make human male philandering a successful strategy for the spread of one's genes (for, essentially, human beings, like all other living organisms, are mere survival machines for the spread of genes).
Concerning this more limited understanding of EP, I have many qualms, some that Buller articulates quite well and others Paul R. Ehrlich articulates. Primarily though, reading a book like Dawkins' The Selfish Gene, I find it difficult to stomach the sort of conjecturing to explain how such and such a psychological mechanism could have arisen, because in fact (1) we do not know the specific conditions within which those mechanisms developed, (b) nor do we know the "rival" mechanisms against which the ones that succeeded competed and proved more successful, (c) nor do we have a clear understanding of how the relationships between genes that give rise to the phenotypes that underly these psychological mechanisms make some mechanisms more successful, not because they are singularly more successful, but because, through an accident of nature, it just tends to be tied to some other structure that is overwhelmingly more successful. (If, for example, I have the two highest trump cards in Euchre, regardless of the rest of my hand, I am more likely to win than not ceteris paribus.)
Further, given our extended life-time relative to our ancestors, we may have many psychological mechanisms that evolved that did not increase reproductive success. Depression and manic-depression (bi-polar disorder), for instance, are disorders that arise sometime after menstruation and even in the early 20's that would have had little to no impact on reproductive success. If we can think of negative psychological mechanisms like these, we ought to be able to uncover positive ones that maybe had no impact on human reproductive success. Finally, EP theorists resist the claim that some of our psychological mechanisms could have evolved since the development of agriculture. They wish to explain everything in terms of differential reproductive success during the Pleistocene era. I think this too limited an approach.
Still, I do not want simply to dismiss this more limited understanding of EP. Certainly some of our psychological mechanisms can be understood well in this manner, though not all. The problem is that people like Dawkins and Pinker believe that all psychology can be reduced, one day, to this more limited approach. That comprises one form of reductivism that must be resisted in the more limited understanding of EP.
Still, the value of an evolutionary approach to human nature should not be undervalued. An understanding of our psychological/motivational structures can help us to understand the particular needs that define the lives of homo sapiens. It is specifically those needs that a critical philosophical anthropology seeks to uncover to make a better life for everyone. Thus, I share with Robert Wright the goal of making life better through an understanding of human nature. I reject, however, the idea that this understanding can come completely from evolution.
One of the more lucid critics of EP, David Buller, makes this point well. Buller notes that one of the more frustrating aspects of the debates concerning EP consists in the fact that supporters and critics often talk past one another because they fail to reach an agreement on exactly what they are talking about. Sometimes, for instance, the term "evolutionary psychology" is "used simply as a shorthand for 'the evolutionary study of mind and behavior' or as a shorthand for theories 'adapting an evolutionary perspective on human behavior and psychology'" (8). If we limit the term EP to mean one of these two things, then I find it irrational not to be an evolutionary psychologist in the modern period if one is seriously writing about human nature. In fact, one of the motivations I have for writing a book on human nature lies in the fact that people writing in science take no notice of what has been written by Aristotelians and Thomists about human nature, and, conversely, Aristotelians and Thomists take no notice of what is written from an evolutionary perspective. Something must be done to correct this lack of dialogue and bring the two paradigms into conversation with each other. Moreover, from my perspective, the Aristotelians and Thomists here prove more at fault, for it is essential to an Aristotelian approach (and Thomas was an Aristotelian, which is why his writings were condemned for some time after his death) to incorporate the findings of science because Aristotle was (a) an empiricist and (b) a scientist. We cannot, then, understand human nature -- what human beings are - without understanding that they are primarily animals -- animals of a specific nature - a rational nature - but still animals. Thomas states that human beings exist at the top of the ladder of animals and at the bottom of the ladder of spiritual beings because they are embodied spirits. The second reason for writing a book on human nature consists in the fact that modern Cartesian dualism has led us to a severe misunderstanding of the human being and, thus, to the modern reductionist materialism that characterizes much of the science today.
Which brings me to the second understanding of "evolutionary psychology." This more limited sense is that shared by Richard Dawkins, Leda Cosmides, John Toody, Steven Pinker, David Buss, Janet Radcliffe Richards, and Richard Wright. It includes research "conducted within a specific set of theoretical and methodological commitments" (8). Briefly, these theoretical commitments include the idea that psychological mechanisms (e.g., motivational mechanisms in the brain) formed through natural selection during the Pleistocene era (1.2 mya - 10 kya) when our ancestors (other hominids and cro-magnons) evovled on and spread out from the savannas of Africa. Further, these psychological mechanisms are ill-suited for modern living because the conditions of the African savannas differ considerably and present different adaptive problems than our current agricultural-cum-urban living environment. The methodological commitment concerns the reverse engineering that EP theorists engage in to determine the function of these psychological mechanisms. If they discover a psychological mechanism that appears culturally universal, they have reason to believe that such a psychological mechanism is part of human nature and, thus, arose during the Pleistocene period. In order to determine the function of that mechanism, EP theorists engage in conjectures about what adapted problems early hominids faced that would explain the adaptive value of the psychological mechanism in question. So, if one wanted ot understand why human males philander, one wonders what sort of conditions would make human male philandering a successful strategy for the spread of one's genes (for, essentially, human beings, like all other living organisms, are mere survival machines for the spread of genes).
Concerning this more limited understanding of EP, I have many qualms, some that Buller articulates quite well and others Paul R. Ehrlich articulates. Primarily though, reading a book like Dawkins' The Selfish Gene, I find it difficult to stomach the sort of conjecturing to explain how such and such a psychological mechanism could have arisen, because in fact (1) we do not know the specific conditions within which those mechanisms developed, (b) nor do we know the "rival" mechanisms against which the ones that succeeded competed and proved more successful, (c) nor do we have a clear understanding of how the relationships between genes that give rise to the phenotypes that underly these psychological mechanisms make some mechanisms more successful, not because they are singularly more successful, but because, through an accident of nature, it just tends to be tied to some other structure that is overwhelmingly more successful. (If, for example, I have the two highest trump cards in Euchre, regardless of the rest of my hand, I am more likely to win than not ceteris paribus.)
Further, given our extended life-time relative to our ancestors, we may have many psychological mechanisms that evolved that did not increase reproductive success. Depression and manic-depression (bi-polar disorder), for instance, are disorders that arise sometime after menstruation and even in the early 20's that would have had little to no impact on reproductive success. If we can think of negative psychological mechanisms like these, we ought to be able to uncover positive ones that maybe had no impact on human reproductive success. Finally, EP theorists resist the claim that some of our psychological mechanisms could have evolved since the development of agriculture. They wish to explain everything in terms of differential reproductive success during the Pleistocene era. I think this too limited an approach.
Still, I do not want simply to dismiss this more limited understanding of EP. Certainly some of our psychological mechanisms can be understood well in this manner, though not all. The problem is that people like Dawkins and Pinker believe that all psychology can be reduced, one day, to this more limited approach. That comprises one form of reductivism that must be resisted in the more limited understanding of EP.
Still, the value of an evolutionary approach to human nature should not be undervalued. An understanding of our psychological/motivational structures can help us to understand the particular needs that define the lives of homo sapiens. It is specifically those needs that a critical philosophical anthropology seeks to uncover to make a better life for everyone. Thus, I share with Robert Wright the goal of making life better through an understanding of human nature. I reject, however, the idea that this understanding can come completely from evolution.
Comments
Dawkins' Fair Share
07/06/11 19:55 Filed in: Human Nature
"But, as we have already seen, some individuals are better life insurance risks than others. An under-sized runt bears just as many of his mother's genes as his more thriving litter mates. But his life expectation is less. Another way to put this point is that he needs more than his fair share."
-- Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 125
Dawkins claims in his book that he is not setting out to make moral or political claims. He is simply trying to explain the biology of selfishness and altruism. He claims that his argument shows that seemingly altruistic behavior arises as a way for selfish genes to propogate themselves, insuring the survival of the genes.
In reading his book, however, we comes across passages like the above. Note the last sentence: the individual runt needs more than his fair share. In the context of biology, what counts as a fair share here? Why even use the term "fair" which is laden with various moral and political meanings? Would it not be better to write something like, "He needs more than what would be evenly proportioned between him and his siblings"? By using the term "fair share" here, Dawkins has, intentionally or not, introduced moral claims into the science he is presenting.
This example does not stand alone in the book. The very use of the term "selfish" has a lot of moral and political meaning behind it, despite Dawkins' claims to the contrary.
The more general point, however, is that science cannot be separated from morality (nor vice versa), and that science occurs within a system of shared understandings that include moral choices. This point is exactly the one Thomas Kuhn made with his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The point does not mean that science is not an attempt to find the truth. Rather, it shows that our attempts to get at the truth may always be limited and will always have presumptions that we need to examine carefully so we know exactly what truth we are believing in. That is both a scientific and a moral point.
-- Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 125
Dawkins claims in his book that he is not setting out to make moral or political claims. He is simply trying to explain the biology of selfishness and altruism. He claims that his argument shows that seemingly altruistic behavior arises as a way for selfish genes to propogate themselves, insuring the survival of the genes.
In reading his book, however, we comes across passages like the above. Note the last sentence: the individual runt needs more than his fair share. In the context of biology, what counts as a fair share here? Why even use the term "fair" which is laden with various moral and political meanings? Would it not be better to write something like, "He needs more than what would be evenly proportioned between him and his siblings"? By using the term "fair share" here, Dawkins has, intentionally or not, introduced moral claims into the science he is presenting.
This example does not stand alone in the book. The very use of the term "selfish" has a lot of moral and political meaning behind it, despite Dawkins' claims to the contrary.
The more general point, however, is that science cannot be separated from morality (nor vice versa), and that science occurs within a system of shared understandings that include moral choices. This point is exactly the one Thomas Kuhn made with his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The point does not mean that science is not an attempt to find the truth. Rather, it shows that our attempts to get at the truth may always be limited and will always have presumptions that we need to examine carefully so we know exactly what truth we are believing in. That is both a scientific and a moral point.
Selfish Gene Mythology
06/06/11 17:46 Filed in: Human Nature
Richard Dawkins published The Selfish Gene back in 1976, and since then, over a million copies have been sold. Dawkins defends the idea that the unit of evolution, of natural selection, is, not the the group or the individual life-form, but the gene. Genes perpetuate themselves and do everything they can to secure their survival, and he calls such behavior selfish. The idea here is that genes compete against rivals and do what they can to make sure that they survive which often means that their rivals do not survive.
What I want to point out in this post is that Dawkins made a particular choice. He chose to use the word selfish to describe the activities of his genes, and that choice tells us two things. First, he tell us that Dawkins prioritized some types of behaviors over others in picking out his unit of natural selection and, second, that Dawkins thought it was "selfishness" is important for Dawkins.
We can easily question the first issue. For Dawkins, what is important is that some entities survive and some do not, that those two types of entities are rivals, or in competition, and that the ones who survive act to preserve themselves at all costs. This account presents what Mary Midgley rightly calls a mythology. The mythology of selfishness of genes, that nature is "red in tooth and claw" and that all of life is about "survival of the fittest" has proven very influential in the modern world, as evidenced both by the number of sales that Dawkins' book generated and also by the spin-off of Dawkins' work in the form of evolutionary psychology. What myths do is take facts and try to present an over-arching story about those facts.
Dawkins has done this for facts about evolution and about survival.
The thing about myths is that they often ignore experience that does not agree with the over-arching mythology and rests on points that it tries to sweep under the carpet. To wit, Dawkins divides the world into selfish entities and altruistic entities. Yet, he completely ignores cooperation. In fact, Dawkins' genes are able to create "survival machines" only because they cooperate with each other to produce such an entity. To explain this in terms of selfish acts/behaviors/choices masks something because cooperation need not be, and often is not, selfish in origin.
This point should give us a pause in how we understand, not only Dawkins' work and popularity, but how we understand evolution and science. We often think of science as "just the facts, ma'am." In fact, however, science, just like every other aspect of life, comes with a slant, which does not mean it isn't true. Just the opposite. But we need to be aware both of that slant and how the slant of science can skew our vision of the world and what we expect from it.
What I want to point out in this post is that Dawkins made a particular choice. He chose to use the word selfish to describe the activities of his genes, and that choice tells us two things. First, he tell us that Dawkins prioritized some types of behaviors over others in picking out his unit of natural selection and, second, that Dawkins thought it was "selfishness" is important for Dawkins.
We can easily question the first issue. For Dawkins, what is important is that some entities survive and some do not, that those two types of entities are rivals, or in competition, and that the ones who survive act to preserve themselves at all costs. This account presents what Mary Midgley rightly calls a mythology. The mythology of selfishness of genes, that nature is "red in tooth and claw" and that all of life is about "survival of the fittest" has proven very influential in the modern world, as evidenced both by the number of sales that Dawkins' book generated and also by the spin-off of Dawkins' work in the form of evolutionary psychology. What myths do is take facts and try to present an over-arching story about those facts.
Dawkins has done this for facts about evolution and about survival.
The thing about myths is that they often ignore experience that does not agree with the over-arching mythology and rests on points that it tries to sweep under the carpet. To wit, Dawkins divides the world into selfish entities and altruistic entities. Yet, he completely ignores cooperation. In fact, Dawkins' genes are able to create "survival machines" only because they cooperate with each other to produce such an entity. To explain this in terms of selfish acts/behaviors/choices masks something because cooperation need not be, and often is not, selfish in origin.
This point should give us a pause in how we understand, not only Dawkins' work and popularity, but how we understand evolution and science. We often think of science as "just the facts, ma'am." In fact, however, science, just like every other aspect of life, comes with a slant, which does not mean it isn't true. Just the opposite. But we need to be aware both of that slant and how the slant of science can skew our vision of the world and what we expect from it.
Careful of Deistic Proofs
07/01/11 18:43 Filed in: Human Nature
A recent Colbert Report episode demonstrated why is so difficult for religious, even - or maybe especially - the pope, to talk about science. I found it amusing, as I am sure you will too, to watch Bill O’Reilly argue that he could not explain how tides come in and go out or how the sun “comes up and goes down.” As Colbert elegantly says, O’Reilly knows God exists because he can’t explain things.
If we Christians insist on trying to use God to explain the mechanical workings of things we will lose the debate and we will misunderstand God, ourselves, and nature. God is the cause of nature, but that does not make Him the efficient cause of everything in nature, except in the way I explained in a previous post on the big bang.
I also want to point out that proofs for God’s existence are generally inductive. The only deductive argument I know of is the Ontological Argument in its various formulations. As Thomas says, however, we cannot grasp the idea of God, so the Ontological Argument does not work for us. The proofs Thomas gives us are all inductive: which means that they lead to the conclusion that God exists but they do not demonstrate the way mathematics proofs demonstrate a conclusion. Inductive arguments are never definitive.
This point proves important if you are familiar with Dawkins’ The God Delusion. In there, Dawkins recounts Thomas’ proofs and says that Thomas asserted he proved God’s existence deductively, then Dawkins goes on to how that they are inductive arguments that prove nothing. First, as I’ve already said, Thomas admits that they are inductive arguments. Second, inductive arguments to prove conclusions. If they did not, we would know no science and we would never be able to convict someone of a crime.
In short, proof does not come in one flavor, and philosophers, theologians, and news pundits should be more careful when they argue for God’s existence or for anything else.
If we Christians insist on trying to use God to explain the mechanical workings of things we will lose the debate and we will misunderstand God, ourselves, and nature. God is the cause of nature, but that does not make Him the efficient cause of everything in nature, except in the way I explained in a previous post on the big bang.
I also want to point out that proofs for God’s existence are generally inductive. The only deductive argument I know of is the Ontological Argument in its various formulations. As Thomas says, however, we cannot grasp the idea of God, so the Ontological Argument does not work for us. The proofs Thomas gives us are all inductive: which means that they lead to the conclusion that God exists but they do not demonstrate the way mathematics proofs demonstrate a conclusion. Inductive arguments are never definitive.
This point proves important if you are familiar with Dawkins’ The God Delusion. In there, Dawkins recounts Thomas’ proofs and says that Thomas asserted he proved God’s existence deductively, then Dawkins goes on to how that they are inductive arguments that prove nothing. First, as I’ve already said, Thomas admits that they are inductive arguments. Second, inductive arguments to prove conclusions. If they did not, we would know no science and we would never be able to convict someone of a crime.
In short, proof does not come in one flavor, and philosophers, theologians, and news pundits should be more careful when they argue for God’s existence or for anything else.
Anti-Dawkins by Dover
17/12/10 22:18 Filed in: Human Nature
I just read an article by Gabrielle Dover called “Anti-Dawkins” which both points out the fallacies of Dawkins’ selfish-gene theory and proposes an alternative to the selfish-gene theory. The argument and the new proposal rest on something biologists have known for some time: genes interact with each other. The fact that they interact with each other tells against the idea that a gene acts selfishly only to reproduce itself. It cannot do this when interacting with other genes, and genes never act in isolation. Second, we can see, so Dover argues, that through modularity, the ways genes interact gene within individual genotypes -- within individual organisms. These changes can be neutral with respect to reproductivity. Yet, if passed on through a population they might later on become important in responding to new environmental stimuli. So a once-neutral trait might be become an exaptation in a new environment. Ian Tattersall suggests that language is such an exaptation.
Part of our problem as a culture, as Dover nicely points out, and as has been pointed out before by the likes of Mary Midgley and Stephen Jay Gould, among others, is that we believe that each gene selects for one particular trait. We would do well to rid ourselves of this false belief which acts, in the case of Dawkins’ selfish gene, on which evolutionary psychology rests, as an ideology.
Part of our problem as a culture, as Dover nicely points out, and as has been pointed out before by the likes of Mary Midgley and Stephen Jay Gould, among others, is that we believe that each gene selects for one particular trait. We would do well to rid ourselves of this false belief which acts, in the case of Dawkins’ selfish gene, on which evolutionary psychology rests, as an ideology.