Alasdair MacIntyre
The Evolution and Sociality of Reason
01/07/11 00:13 Filed in: Human Nature
Gary Gutting provides an interesting discussion of the social nature of reason based on an article much commented on over the web by Sperber and Mercier.
The basic argument from Sperber and Mercier is this: in reason, human beings show certain inadequacies: they tend to give credence to evidence that agrees with their position than that disagrees, our deductive logical ability proves weak, and our statistical reasoning proves even weaker. Because of these inadequacies, they argue that reason evolved, not so much to reach the truth, but in order to win arguments. In fact, what Sperber and Mercier find through empirical research is that human beings are much better at arguing than they are at individual uses of logic, and that human beings reasoning in social groups prove have better results than those reasoning alone.
Gutting goes on to say that various philosophers -- from Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas to pragmatists like Peirce, James, and Dewey -- have argued for a more social view of reason. Gutting says that they show that "justification is a matter of being able to convince other people that a claim is correct." Gutting denies that Sperber and Mercier's theory leads to relativism or sophism. Rather, he says, we need to rethink the relationship between truth and argumentation.
Truth involves, not my argument beating yours -- which is how many people understood Sperber and Mercier -- but in our argument defeating all others.
Interestingly enough, Gutting does not mention Alasdair MacIntyre in this pantheon of people on social reasoning. In fact, however, MacIntyre's conception of the "best argument so far" relies on the idea that we get closer to the truth by constantly having our arguments challenged and coming out better in dealing with the real world than other arguments. Of course, argumentation requires social engagement, and, tellingly, when traditions fail to challenge their shared agreements or do not allow arguments within them, these traditions stagnate and fail to advance toward what we recognize as truth.
A question remains, however: can reason evolve that make it not social? That is, Aristotle notes that we are social animals because we have logos -- speech and reason. Yet, we can wonder whether there are creatures much different than ourselves that have managed to reason without argumentation and without the correctives of social reasoning?
We can also look into some of the biases that attend the readings of Rorty -- who denied any truth -- and Habermas -- who insists that language is aimed at understanding. Sperber and Mercier's arguments seem to suggest that language and reasoning might not be about reaching understanding. In fact, a Nietzschean could come into the picture and play havoc with their argument, for they would have to show somehow that it was not evolutionarily feasible that the better arguments and deceivers were able to out-reproduce those who were honest or not good arguers. Only by keeping the notion of truth within the equation -- as Gutting does in the end -- can such Nietzschean moves be avoided.
The basic argument from Sperber and Mercier is this: in reason, human beings show certain inadequacies: they tend to give credence to evidence that agrees with their position than that disagrees, our deductive logical ability proves weak, and our statistical reasoning proves even weaker. Because of these inadequacies, they argue that reason evolved, not so much to reach the truth, but in order to win arguments. In fact, what Sperber and Mercier find through empirical research is that human beings are much better at arguing than they are at individual uses of logic, and that human beings reasoning in social groups prove have better results than those reasoning alone.
Gutting goes on to say that various philosophers -- from Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas to pragmatists like Peirce, James, and Dewey -- have argued for a more social view of reason. Gutting says that they show that "justification is a matter of being able to convince other people that a claim is correct." Gutting denies that Sperber and Mercier's theory leads to relativism or sophism. Rather, he says, we need to rethink the relationship between truth and argumentation.
Truth involves, not my argument beating yours -- which is how many people understood Sperber and Mercier -- but in our argument defeating all others.
Interestingly enough, Gutting does not mention Alasdair MacIntyre in this pantheon of people on social reasoning. In fact, however, MacIntyre's conception of the "best argument so far" relies on the idea that we get closer to the truth by constantly having our arguments challenged and coming out better in dealing with the real world than other arguments. Of course, argumentation requires social engagement, and, tellingly, when traditions fail to challenge their shared agreements or do not allow arguments within them, these traditions stagnate and fail to advance toward what we recognize as truth.
A question remains, however: can reason evolve that make it not social? That is, Aristotle notes that we are social animals because we have logos -- speech and reason. Yet, we can wonder whether there are creatures much different than ourselves that have managed to reason without argumentation and without the correctives of social reasoning?
We can also look into some of the biases that attend the readings of Rorty -- who denied any truth -- and Habermas -- who insists that language is aimed at understanding. Sperber and Mercier's arguments seem to suggest that language and reasoning might not be about reaching understanding. In fact, a Nietzschean could come into the picture and play havoc with their argument, for they would have to show somehow that it was not evolutionarily feasible that the better arguments and deceivers were able to out-reproduce those who were honest or not good arguers. Only by keeping the notion of truth within the equation -- as Gutting does in the end -- can such Nietzschean moves be avoided.
Comments
Rational Choice Theory is Wrong
22/06/11 23:36 Filed in: Human Nature
John Mccumber wrote an interesting piece in the New York Times Opinionator section.
Here's my understanding of the article: Mccumber is against Rational Choice Philosophy, by which he means an ontology, an epistemology, and an ethics. He believes that Quine, Carson, and Rawls put paid to the individual claims in each of those fields because, every theory is undetermined (which undermines the idea that we can choose between a distinct group of theories), we don't have certainty even in the short term, and every philosophy of choice, including rational choice philosophy, includes certain values. Mccumber further ASSERTS that Hegel made many of these observations and proposed an alternative to rational choice philosophy. In particular, Hegel showed the social character of reason (though, I must say, I stated that more clearly than Mccumber did). Mccumber is convinced that, even if Quine, Carson, and Rawls undermine individual aspects of rational choice philosophy, they tend, as does rational choice philosophy, to "absolutize choice," by which phrase I think Mccumber means that rational choice philosophy values choice as choice. (This, I take it, is why I think the video link I sent addresses rational choice philosophy's failure and why I thought it relevant to McCrumb, though, again, McCrumb has not been quite elegant in his discussion.) Mccumber finished with his conclusion "The result might look quite a bit like Hegel in its view that individual freedom is of value only when communally guided."
Here are two possible objections: It seems to (1) lay the onus of proof on allusions to Hegel and (2) it seems to end with the idea that we must trust in our community rather than our own decision making. I think point 1 is true: Mccumber relies heavily on Hegel, which is surprising. It's surprising, not because Hegel is wrong, but because I would imagine most people reading the NY Times have not read Hegel, and so it makes Hegel a poor choice for reference. Aristotle would have been much better, or simply stating the alternative better still. As for point 2, I think that the article does tend to favor some sort of conclusion along the lines that our community ought to do our thinking for us. The last line smacks too much of a right-wing Hegelianism: "The result might look quite a bit like Hegel in its view that individual freedom is of value only when communally guided." I say right-wing Hegelianism to contrast it with left-wing Marxist type hegelianism, which Mccumber seems also to reject. Also, because the problem with right-wing Hegelianism is exactly that Hegel's philosophy ends with the idea that the state is supreme. The state is the embodiment of the idea, which is worked out historically by Geist. Hegel might have meant that, or he might have meant something more subtle.
Okay, now to the most important point, Why do I think that rational choice philosophy is wrong? Part of the question centers on what one means by "rational choice philosophy”?
If it means simply "human beings make rational choices" then rational choice philosophy hardly deserves a name. This is true for Aristotle and Thomas as it is for Hegel and Kant, as it is for Rand and Rawls.
Then, is rational choice philosophy simply those three theses that Mccumber ascribes to it in his article: ontological clarity, epistemological certainty, and ethical egoism/wealth-mongering. If thisis what it means, then I think we've enough evidence to say Mccumber is right: rational choice philosophy has failed. We do not have certainty even short term. Think, for instance, of giving one's spouse flowers or some other present. We do it to be nice, but then the spouse might accuse one of cheating or doing something for which one needed to give flowers. At the every day level -- and certainly long term economic level -- rational choice philosophy does not pay out. Ontologically, there are not simple causal chains which we can pick up and choose between. This is the conceit behind the recent movie Limitless. The character has a 4-digit IQ which allows him to figure out how the market will move. But that is fiction. Too many things can cause the same phenomena which leads to indeterminacy between choices -- all could be equally rational. Finally, we are not people who seek only wealth and power to satisfy our needs. Sometimes, wealth and power can interfere with those needs. Here Limitless, the movie, gets close to pointing it out, but in the end it buys into this conceit as well. Now, if one buys into any of those three theses, then one might stil be a rational choice theorist. If we disagree on these points, then that gives us something more to discuss, but probably not on this thread.
Then, that leaves us with the question, could rational choice philosophy be something different or more? Mccumber is as obtuse here as Hegel. He writes at one point, though, the following: "Today, governments and businesses across the globe simply assume that social reality is merely a set of individuals freely making rational choices." So, I think by rational choice philosophy he means the three theses above plus the idea that "social reality consists simply in individuals freely making rational choices." Here, a long line of thinkers would disagree: Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Hegel, Marx, Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, Joan Callahan, Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick, Kathleen Iannello (Decisions without hierarchy) among many others.
Why?
Simply put: we are not individual atoms bumping into each other on occasion. We are social beings -- social animals as Aristotle says -- which means that our identity (subjectivity in Foucault's philosophy) is shaped by and shapes our communities/society/traditions. Yes, I make rational decisions (I hope), but even my rationality is shaped by my culture: what I find more or less rational, what modes of reasoning are available to me, to what extent I’ve been trained to think reasonably, what forms of discourse I’ve been introduced to, etc. This fact does not make me any the less rational. Au contraire, it is the very conditions for being rational at all.
This, I take it, is the gist of MacIntyre’s theory in AV, and certainly the argument I bring to bear in Reason, Tradition, and the Good.
Here's my understanding of the article: Mccumber is against Rational Choice Philosophy, by which he means an ontology, an epistemology, and an ethics. He believes that Quine, Carson, and Rawls put paid to the individual claims in each of those fields because, every theory is undetermined (which undermines the idea that we can choose between a distinct group of theories), we don't have certainty even in the short term, and every philosophy of choice, including rational choice philosophy, includes certain values. Mccumber further ASSERTS that Hegel made many of these observations and proposed an alternative to rational choice philosophy. In particular, Hegel showed the social character of reason (though, I must say, I stated that more clearly than Mccumber did). Mccumber is convinced that, even if Quine, Carson, and Rawls undermine individual aspects of rational choice philosophy, they tend, as does rational choice philosophy, to "absolutize choice," by which phrase I think Mccumber means that rational choice philosophy values choice as choice. (This, I take it, is why I think the video link I sent addresses rational choice philosophy's failure and why I thought it relevant to McCrumb, though, again, McCrumb has not been quite elegant in his discussion.) Mccumber finished with his conclusion "The result might look quite a bit like Hegel in its view that individual freedom is of value only when communally guided."
Here are two possible objections: It seems to (1) lay the onus of proof on allusions to Hegel and (2) it seems to end with the idea that we must trust in our community rather than our own decision making. I think point 1 is true: Mccumber relies heavily on Hegel, which is surprising. It's surprising, not because Hegel is wrong, but because I would imagine most people reading the NY Times have not read Hegel, and so it makes Hegel a poor choice for reference. Aristotle would have been much better, or simply stating the alternative better still. As for point 2, I think that the article does tend to favor some sort of conclusion along the lines that our community ought to do our thinking for us. The last line smacks too much of a right-wing Hegelianism: "The result might look quite a bit like Hegel in its view that individual freedom is of value only when communally guided." I say right-wing Hegelianism to contrast it with left-wing Marxist type hegelianism, which Mccumber seems also to reject. Also, because the problem with right-wing Hegelianism is exactly that Hegel's philosophy ends with the idea that the state is supreme. The state is the embodiment of the idea, which is worked out historically by Geist. Hegel might have meant that, or he might have meant something more subtle.
Okay, now to the most important point, Why do I think that rational choice philosophy is wrong? Part of the question centers on what one means by "rational choice philosophy”?
If it means simply "human beings make rational choices" then rational choice philosophy hardly deserves a name. This is true for Aristotle and Thomas as it is for Hegel and Kant, as it is for Rand and Rawls.
Then, is rational choice philosophy simply those three theses that Mccumber ascribes to it in his article: ontological clarity, epistemological certainty, and ethical egoism/wealth-mongering. If thisis what it means, then I think we've enough evidence to say Mccumber is right: rational choice philosophy has failed. We do not have certainty even short term. Think, for instance, of giving one's spouse flowers or some other present. We do it to be nice, but then the spouse might accuse one of cheating or doing something for which one needed to give flowers. At the every day level -- and certainly long term economic level -- rational choice philosophy does not pay out. Ontologically, there are not simple causal chains which we can pick up and choose between. This is the conceit behind the recent movie Limitless. The character has a 4-digit IQ which allows him to figure out how the market will move. But that is fiction. Too many things can cause the same phenomena which leads to indeterminacy between choices -- all could be equally rational. Finally, we are not people who seek only wealth and power to satisfy our needs. Sometimes, wealth and power can interfere with those needs. Here Limitless, the movie, gets close to pointing it out, but in the end it buys into this conceit as well. Now, if one buys into any of those three theses, then one might stil be a rational choice theorist. If we disagree on these points, then that gives us something more to discuss, but probably not on this thread.
Then, that leaves us with the question, could rational choice philosophy be something different or more? Mccumber is as obtuse here as Hegel. He writes at one point, though, the following: "Today, governments and businesses across the globe simply assume that social reality is merely a set of individuals freely making rational choices." So, I think by rational choice philosophy he means the three theses above plus the idea that "social reality consists simply in individuals freely making rational choices." Here, a long line of thinkers would disagree: Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Hegel, Marx, Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, Joan Callahan, Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick, Kathleen Iannello (Decisions without hierarchy) among many others.
Why?
Simply put: we are not individual atoms bumping into each other on occasion. We are social beings -- social animals as Aristotle says -- which means that our identity (subjectivity in Foucault's philosophy) is shaped by and shapes our communities/society/traditions. Yes, I make rational decisions (I hope), but even my rationality is shaped by my culture: what I find more or less rational, what modes of reasoning are available to me, to what extent I’ve been trained to think reasonably, what forms of discourse I’ve been introduced to, etc. This fact does not make me any the less rational. Au contraire, it is the very conditions for being rational at all.
This, I take it, is the gist of MacIntyre’s theory in AV, and certainly the argument I bring to bear in Reason, Tradition, and the Good.