The Evolution and Sociality of Reason
30/06/11 16:13 Filed in: Human Nature
Gary Gutting provides an interesting discussion of the social nature of reason based on an article much commented on over the web by Sperber and Mercier.
The basic argument from Sperber and Mercier is this: in reason, human beings show certain inadequacies: they tend to give credence to evidence that agrees with their position than that disagrees, our deductive logical ability proves weak, and our statistical reasoning proves even weaker. Because of these inadequacies, they argue that reason evolved, not so much to reach the truth, but in order to win arguments. In fact, what Sperber and Mercier find through empirical research is that human beings are much better at arguing than they are at individual uses of logic, and that human beings reasoning in social groups prove have better results than those reasoning alone.
Gutting goes on to say that various philosophers -- from Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas to pragmatists like Peirce, James, and Dewey -- have argued for a more social view of reason. Gutting says that they show that "justification is a matter of being able to convince other people that a claim is correct." Gutting denies that Sperber and Mercier's theory leads to relativism or sophism. Rather, he says, we need to rethink the relationship between truth and argumentation.
Truth involves, not my argument beating yours -- which is how many people understood Sperber and Mercier -- but in our argument defeating all others.
Interestingly enough, Gutting does not mention Alasdair MacIntyre in this pantheon of people on social reasoning. In fact, however, MacIntyre's conception of the "best argument so far" relies on the idea that we get closer to the truth by constantly having our arguments challenged and coming out better in dealing with the real world than other arguments. Of course, argumentation requires social engagement, and, tellingly, when traditions fail to challenge their shared agreements or do not allow arguments within them, these traditions stagnate and fail to advance toward what we recognize as truth.
A question remains, however: can reason evolve that make it not social? That is, Aristotle notes that we are social animals because we have logos -- speech and reason. Yet, we can wonder whether there are creatures much different than ourselves that have managed to reason without argumentation and without the correctives of social reasoning?
We can also look into some of the biases that attend the readings of Rorty -- who denied any truth -- and Habermas -- who insists that language is aimed at understanding. Sperber and Mercier's arguments seem to suggest that language and reasoning might not be about reaching understanding. In fact, a Nietzschean could come into the picture and play havoc with their argument, for they would have to show somehow that it was not evolutionarily feasible that the better arguments and deceivers were able to out-reproduce those who were honest or not good arguers. Only by keeping the notion of truth within the equation -- as Gutting does in the end -- can such Nietzschean moves be avoided.
The basic argument from Sperber and Mercier is this: in reason, human beings show certain inadequacies: they tend to give credence to evidence that agrees with their position than that disagrees, our deductive logical ability proves weak, and our statistical reasoning proves even weaker. Because of these inadequacies, they argue that reason evolved, not so much to reach the truth, but in order to win arguments. In fact, what Sperber and Mercier find through empirical research is that human beings are much better at arguing than they are at individual uses of logic, and that human beings reasoning in social groups prove have better results than those reasoning alone.
Gutting goes on to say that various philosophers -- from Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas to pragmatists like Peirce, James, and Dewey -- have argued for a more social view of reason. Gutting says that they show that "justification is a matter of being able to convince other people that a claim is correct." Gutting denies that Sperber and Mercier's theory leads to relativism or sophism. Rather, he says, we need to rethink the relationship between truth and argumentation.
Truth involves, not my argument beating yours -- which is how many people understood Sperber and Mercier -- but in our argument defeating all others.
Interestingly enough, Gutting does not mention Alasdair MacIntyre in this pantheon of people on social reasoning. In fact, however, MacIntyre's conception of the "best argument so far" relies on the idea that we get closer to the truth by constantly having our arguments challenged and coming out better in dealing with the real world than other arguments. Of course, argumentation requires social engagement, and, tellingly, when traditions fail to challenge their shared agreements or do not allow arguments within them, these traditions stagnate and fail to advance toward what we recognize as truth.
A question remains, however: can reason evolve that make it not social? That is, Aristotle notes that we are social animals because we have logos -- speech and reason. Yet, we can wonder whether there are creatures much different than ourselves that have managed to reason without argumentation and without the correctives of social reasoning?
We can also look into some of the biases that attend the readings of Rorty -- who denied any truth -- and Habermas -- who insists that language is aimed at understanding. Sperber and Mercier's arguments seem to suggest that language and reasoning might not be about reaching understanding. In fact, a Nietzschean could come into the picture and play havoc with their argument, for they would have to show somehow that it was not evolutionarily feasible that the better arguments and deceivers were able to out-reproduce those who were honest or not good arguers. Only by keeping the notion of truth within the equation -- as Gutting does in the end -- can such Nietzschean moves be avoided.
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