Evolution of Responsibility part 3
13/07/11 00:05 Filed in: Human Nature
This is the third of three posts addressing the debate about free will and determinism from the perspective of evolutionary psychology (EP) in the works of Richard Dawkins, Robert Wright, Martin Daly and Margo Wilson (M&M), and others. In the first post, I laid out what I took to be the overall confusion within the EP literature about exactly what was up for debate. In the second post, I examined what Wright called one of the clearest accounts of determinism and responsibility in chapter 11 of M&M's Homicide. In this post, I want to address one simple question: How is it that animals developed something like free will?
The primary philosophical task of any enterprise consists in being clear on what exactly one is seeking -- what are the terms of debate, what are the issues addressed, what are the answers proposed. I have shown in the first post that, primarily, EP theorists do not have a clear account of the terms of the debate. In the second post, I showed that, even if (as I believe) free will arose through evolution, EP theorists do not address the right issues. Here, I begin by explaining that one issue that should be addressed is exactly the nature of free will.
I would rather say that, instead of discussing free will -- a nebulous term used in many different ways by philosophers -- we ought to speak of free choice (or free choice of the will, if you insist). The reason I think that free choice comprises better terminology for the debate is three-fold: first, my understanding of free choice arises out of a tradition based in Aristotle who did not even have a conception of will though he did have a conception of voluntary action. Second, the term "will" or "free will" is too loaded for any practical clarity at this time. This point is exemplified in the various EP discussions concerning determinism. Finally, and most importantly, the notion of "choice" over "will" provides a better understanding of exactly how animal evolved to make free, undetermined (but caused) choices.
Animals are presented with choices all the time, particularly those animals that move. Yet, some of these animals experience the choice as determined. A favorite example in the EP lit is that of the dance of the honey bee. The honey bee flies out of its hive and seeks flowers in which to find nectar. It has a choice: fly straight, fly left, fly right. Yet, the choice here cannot be seen as undetermined. A bee's direction is given by the path that other bees in the hive have taken to find nectar or by the smell of nearby flowers. Even the dance that the bee flies when it returns to report the discovery of nectar is determined minutely and has been recorded and studied by scientists.
The choice of the bee differs significantly from the choice of wolf in a hunt. When a pack of wolves hunt, how they form up for the hunt is determined by hierarchy (which, itself, can be challenged at times). When a wolf spots prey, it howls and the chase is on. Yet, when the prey charges one way, why does the wolf charge another? Here, the choice cannot be determined ahead of time: there are simply too many variables for wolf brains to have evolved enough instructions in them to map out the exact hunting pattern of the wolf. Thus, sometimes wolves fail to catch their prey (but only in reality, not in the movies). Wolves learn through experience how to pursue and what works and does not work in the hunt, how to respond to particular moves by particular individuals of differing species (which individuals exhibit their own choices). Now, when I describe the wolf's choices as directed by learning, I live open the possibility that such learning could be more rather than less determinative. The wolf makes quick decisions in the chase as directed by how past chases have gone. Still, there are enough variations of chase that the wolf's learning could not determine in every situation when prey turns left than wolf turn slightly more left. The wolf decides between different options.
Just as you and I decide between differing options in a variety of situation. For example, when we run, we have to decide how to place our feet on the path. Every path is different though similarities exist. I know that running on a path with a lot of twists and turns to be more flexible or to place my foot more gently. These are not decisions I necessarily think about, but they are decisions brought about through learning and from which I learn.
What distinguishes the human choice from the choice of the wolf is that homo sapiens have evolved an ability to reflect on their choices. I can after a run reflect on how the run went, how well I ran, how I should have turned my foot this way rather than that way. The wolf cannot reflect on her hunt. She hunts. She learns, but she does not evaluate. Why? Because she lacks a language by which to make such evaluations. Human beings are the only animals which we know that have the capacity for symbolic representation. That capacity allows us to represent to ourselves our experiences in a way that the wolf lacks. And because we can make such representations, we can also evaluate those representations.
In my last post about M&M's account of responsibility, I ended by asking how a notion of responsibility could arise without language. Here we see that language becomes central to free choice in a way that makes our choices significantly undetermined and yet still caused. They are undetermined because, no matter how much learning I have had, no matter how much experience I've undergone, I can always over-ride the directives of those experiences -- because I can represent them symbolically to myself in different ways and present even other options for future action. Yet, my choices are caused. They are caused by my own reflections on the quality of choices I have made and the quality of choices in front of me. These reflections can suffer impairment or, in the words of EP, diminishment. To some extent, I may not be able to see any but one choice because my genes dictate that choice (e.g., drinking the alcohol). But human life, much like that of the wolf's, is too complex and too complicated to have all our choices determined -- even probabilistically -- by our genes or our genes and culture working together.
As such, free choice depends on our ability to symbolically represent experience and past and future choices and our ability to imagine alternatives. These abilities depend essentially on our culture and education. Primarily, we receive the virtues which allow us to make more, rather than less, free choices through our education in practices, which we learn from our culture.
In one sense, then, I am accepting much of what EP says: yes, our genes and environment in which those genes are expressed determine -- by limiting -- our behavior. Yet, I am denying that such limits set any significant boundaries on our ability to choose freely. Rather, they provide the conditions by which we are able to make free choices. Free choice rests on an ability to evaluate the choices before us in a way that may sometimes be determined but in many cases are not determined. Rather than seeing ourselves as either completely free or completely determined, I propose that we see ourselves existing at any one time on a continuum of more or less free choices.
To end, I could have named this post "Why doesn't anyone read Mary Midgley? Mary Midgley is a very accessible writer who has been engaged in these types of issues for forty years. Her best book is Beast and Man, and from it, I took the example of the bee's dance and the wolf's hunt. Unfortunately, Midgley is rarely cited in the EP literature, perhaps because her argument against Wilson's sociobiology proves so devastating. Significantly, as well, I see Midgley as a modern-day Aristotelian, for it was Aristotle who first formulated the ethology that informs her and my own work. I recommend her work highgly.
The primary philosophical task of any enterprise consists in being clear on what exactly one is seeking -- what are the terms of debate, what are the issues addressed, what are the answers proposed. I have shown in the first post that, primarily, EP theorists do not have a clear account of the terms of the debate. In the second post, I showed that, even if (as I believe) free will arose through evolution, EP theorists do not address the right issues. Here, I begin by explaining that one issue that should be addressed is exactly the nature of free will.
I would rather say that, instead of discussing free will -- a nebulous term used in many different ways by philosophers -- we ought to speak of free choice (or free choice of the will, if you insist). The reason I think that free choice comprises better terminology for the debate is three-fold: first, my understanding of free choice arises out of a tradition based in Aristotle who did not even have a conception of will though he did have a conception of voluntary action. Second, the term "will" or "free will" is too loaded for any practical clarity at this time. This point is exemplified in the various EP discussions concerning determinism. Finally, and most importantly, the notion of "choice" over "will" provides a better understanding of exactly how animal evolved to make free, undetermined (but caused) choices.
Animals are presented with choices all the time, particularly those animals that move. Yet, some of these animals experience the choice as determined. A favorite example in the EP lit is that of the dance of the honey bee. The honey bee flies out of its hive and seeks flowers in which to find nectar. It has a choice: fly straight, fly left, fly right. Yet, the choice here cannot be seen as undetermined. A bee's direction is given by the path that other bees in the hive have taken to find nectar or by the smell of nearby flowers. Even the dance that the bee flies when it returns to report the discovery of nectar is determined minutely and has been recorded and studied by scientists.
The choice of the bee differs significantly from the choice of wolf in a hunt. When a pack of wolves hunt, how they form up for the hunt is determined by hierarchy (which, itself, can be challenged at times). When a wolf spots prey, it howls and the chase is on. Yet, when the prey charges one way, why does the wolf charge another? Here, the choice cannot be determined ahead of time: there are simply too many variables for wolf brains to have evolved enough instructions in them to map out the exact hunting pattern of the wolf. Thus, sometimes wolves fail to catch their prey (but only in reality, not in the movies). Wolves learn through experience how to pursue and what works and does not work in the hunt, how to respond to particular moves by particular individuals of differing species (which individuals exhibit their own choices). Now, when I describe the wolf's choices as directed by learning, I live open the possibility that such learning could be more rather than less determinative. The wolf makes quick decisions in the chase as directed by how past chases have gone. Still, there are enough variations of chase that the wolf's learning could not determine in every situation when prey turns left than wolf turn slightly more left. The wolf decides between different options.
Just as you and I decide between differing options in a variety of situation. For example, when we run, we have to decide how to place our feet on the path. Every path is different though similarities exist. I know that running on a path with a lot of twists and turns to be more flexible or to place my foot more gently. These are not decisions I necessarily think about, but they are decisions brought about through learning and from which I learn.
What distinguishes the human choice from the choice of the wolf is that homo sapiens have evolved an ability to reflect on their choices. I can after a run reflect on how the run went, how well I ran, how I should have turned my foot this way rather than that way. The wolf cannot reflect on her hunt. She hunts. She learns, but she does not evaluate. Why? Because she lacks a language by which to make such evaluations. Human beings are the only animals which we know that have the capacity for symbolic representation. That capacity allows us to represent to ourselves our experiences in a way that the wolf lacks. And because we can make such representations, we can also evaluate those representations.
In my last post about M&M's account of responsibility, I ended by asking how a notion of responsibility could arise without language. Here we see that language becomes central to free choice in a way that makes our choices significantly undetermined and yet still caused. They are undetermined because, no matter how much learning I have had, no matter how much experience I've undergone, I can always over-ride the directives of those experiences -- because I can represent them symbolically to myself in different ways and present even other options for future action. Yet, my choices are caused. They are caused by my own reflections on the quality of choices I have made and the quality of choices in front of me. These reflections can suffer impairment or, in the words of EP, diminishment. To some extent, I may not be able to see any but one choice because my genes dictate that choice (e.g., drinking the alcohol). But human life, much like that of the wolf's, is too complex and too complicated to have all our choices determined -- even probabilistically -- by our genes or our genes and culture working together.
As such, free choice depends on our ability to symbolically represent experience and past and future choices and our ability to imagine alternatives. These abilities depend essentially on our culture and education. Primarily, we receive the virtues which allow us to make more, rather than less, free choices through our education in practices, which we learn from our culture.
In one sense, then, I am accepting much of what EP says: yes, our genes and environment in which those genes are expressed determine -- by limiting -- our behavior. Yet, I am denying that such limits set any significant boundaries on our ability to choose freely. Rather, they provide the conditions by which we are able to make free choices. Free choice rests on an ability to evaluate the choices before us in a way that may sometimes be determined but in many cases are not determined. Rather than seeing ourselves as either completely free or completely determined, I propose that we see ourselves existing at any one time on a continuum of more or less free choices.
To end, I could have named this post "Why doesn't anyone read Mary Midgley? Mary Midgley is a very accessible writer who has been engaged in these types of issues for forty years. Her best book is Beast and Man, and from it, I took the example of the bee's dance and the wolf's hunt. Unfortunately, Midgley is rarely cited in the EP literature, perhaps because her argument against Wilson's sociobiology proves so devastating. Significantly, as well, I see Midgley as a modern-day Aristotelian, for it was Aristotle who first formulated the ethology that informs her and my own work. I recommend her work highgly.
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