Rational Choice Theory is Wrong
22/06/11 23:36 Filed in: Human Nature
John Mccumber wrote an interesting piece in the New York Times Opinionator section.
Here's my understanding of the article: Mccumber is against Rational Choice Philosophy, by which he means an ontology, an epistemology, and an ethics. He believes that Quine, Carson, and Rawls put paid to the individual claims in each of those fields because, every theory is undetermined (which undermines the idea that we can choose between a distinct group of theories), we don't have certainty even in the short term, and every philosophy of choice, including rational choice philosophy, includes certain values. Mccumber further ASSERTS that Hegel made many of these observations and proposed an alternative to rational choice philosophy. In particular, Hegel showed the social character of reason (though, I must say, I stated that more clearly than Mccumber did). Mccumber is convinced that, even if Quine, Carson, and Rawls undermine individual aspects of rational choice philosophy, they tend, as does rational choice philosophy, to "absolutize choice," by which phrase I think Mccumber means that rational choice philosophy values choice as choice. (This, I take it, is why I think the video link I sent addresses rational choice philosophy's failure and why I thought it relevant to McCrumb, though, again, McCrumb has not been quite elegant in his discussion.) Mccumber finished with his conclusion "The result might look quite a bit like Hegel in its view that individual freedom is of value only when communally guided."
Here are two possible objections: It seems to (1) lay the onus of proof on allusions to Hegel and (2) it seems to end with the idea that we must trust in our community rather than our own decision making. I think point 1 is true: Mccumber relies heavily on Hegel, which is surprising. It's surprising, not because Hegel is wrong, but because I would imagine most people reading the NY Times have not read Hegel, and so it makes Hegel a poor choice for reference. Aristotle would have been much better, or simply stating the alternative better still. As for point 2, I think that the article does tend to favor some sort of conclusion along the lines that our community ought to do our thinking for us. The last line smacks too much of a right-wing Hegelianism: "The result might look quite a bit like Hegel in its view that individual freedom is of value only when communally guided." I say right-wing Hegelianism to contrast it with left-wing Marxist type hegelianism, which Mccumber seems also to reject. Also, because the problem with right-wing Hegelianism is exactly that Hegel's philosophy ends with the idea that the state is supreme. The state is the embodiment of the idea, which is worked out historically by Geist. Hegel might have meant that, or he might have meant something more subtle.
Okay, now to the most important point, Why do I think that rational choice philosophy is wrong? Part of the question centers on what one means by "rational choice philosophy”?
If it means simply "human beings make rational choices" then rational choice philosophy hardly deserves a name. This is true for Aristotle and Thomas as it is for Hegel and Kant, as it is for Rand and Rawls.
Then, is rational choice philosophy simply those three theses that Mccumber ascribes to it in his article: ontological clarity, epistemological certainty, and ethical egoism/wealth-mongering. If thisis what it means, then I think we've enough evidence to say Mccumber is right: rational choice philosophy has failed. We do not have certainty even short term. Think, for instance, of giving one's spouse flowers or some other present. We do it to be nice, but then the spouse might accuse one of cheating or doing something for which one needed to give flowers. At the every day level -- and certainly long term economic level -- rational choice philosophy does not pay out. Ontologically, there are not simple causal chains which we can pick up and choose between. This is the conceit behind the recent movie Limitless. The character has a 4-digit IQ which allows him to figure out how the market will move. But that is fiction. Too many things can cause the same phenomena which leads to indeterminacy between choices -- all could be equally rational. Finally, we are not people who seek only wealth and power to satisfy our needs. Sometimes, wealth and power can interfere with those needs. Here Limitless, the movie, gets close to pointing it out, but in the end it buys into this conceit as well. Now, if one buys into any of those three theses, then one might stil be a rational choice theorist. If we disagree on these points, then that gives us something more to discuss, but probably not on this thread.
Then, that leaves us with the question, could rational choice philosophy be something different or more? Mccumber is as obtuse here as Hegel. He writes at one point, though, the following: "Today, governments and businesses across the globe simply assume that social reality is merely a set of individuals freely making rational choices." So, I think by rational choice philosophy he means the three theses above plus the idea that "social reality consists simply in individuals freely making rational choices." Here, a long line of thinkers would disagree: Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Hegel, Marx, Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, Joan Callahan, Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick, Kathleen Iannello (Decisions without hierarchy) among many others.
Why?
Simply put: we are not individual atoms bumping into each other on occasion. We are social beings -- social animals as Aristotle says -- which means that our identity (subjectivity in Foucault's philosophy) is shaped by and shapes our communities/society/traditions. Yes, I make rational decisions (I hope), but even my rationality is shaped by my culture: what I find more or less rational, what modes of reasoning are available to me, to what extent I’ve been trained to think reasonably, what forms of discourse I’ve been introduced to, etc. This fact does not make me any the less rational. Au contraire, it is the very conditions for being rational at all.
This, I take it, is the gist of MacIntyre’s theory in AV, and certainly the argument I bring to bear in Reason, Tradition, and the Good.
Here's my understanding of the article: Mccumber is against Rational Choice Philosophy, by which he means an ontology, an epistemology, and an ethics. He believes that Quine, Carson, and Rawls put paid to the individual claims in each of those fields because, every theory is undetermined (which undermines the idea that we can choose between a distinct group of theories), we don't have certainty even in the short term, and every philosophy of choice, including rational choice philosophy, includes certain values. Mccumber further ASSERTS that Hegel made many of these observations and proposed an alternative to rational choice philosophy. In particular, Hegel showed the social character of reason (though, I must say, I stated that more clearly than Mccumber did). Mccumber is convinced that, even if Quine, Carson, and Rawls undermine individual aspects of rational choice philosophy, they tend, as does rational choice philosophy, to "absolutize choice," by which phrase I think Mccumber means that rational choice philosophy values choice as choice. (This, I take it, is why I think the video link I sent addresses rational choice philosophy's failure and why I thought it relevant to McCrumb, though, again, McCrumb has not been quite elegant in his discussion.) Mccumber finished with his conclusion "The result might look quite a bit like Hegel in its view that individual freedom is of value only when communally guided."
Here are two possible objections: It seems to (1) lay the onus of proof on allusions to Hegel and (2) it seems to end with the idea that we must trust in our community rather than our own decision making. I think point 1 is true: Mccumber relies heavily on Hegel, which is surprising. It's surprising, not because Hegel is wrong, but because I would imagine most people reading the NY Times have not read Hegel, and so it makes Hegel a poor choice for reference. Aristotle would have been much better, or simply stating the alternative better still. As for point 2, I think that the article does tend to favor some sort of conclusion along the lines that our community ought to do our thinking for us. The last line smacks too much of a right-wing Hegelianism: "The result might look quite a bit like Hegel in its view that individual freedom is of value only when communally guided." I say right-wing Hegelianism to contrast it with left-wing Marxist type hegelianism, which Mccumber seems also to reject. Also, because the problem with right-wing Hegelianism is exactly that Hegel's philosophy ends with the idea that the state is supreme. The state is the embodiment of the idea, which is worked out historically by Geist. Hegel might have meant that, or he might have meant something more subtle.
Okay, now to the most important point, Why do I think that rational choice philosophy is wrong? Part of the question centers on what one means by "rational choice philosophy”?
If it means simply "human beings make rational choices" then rational choice philosophy hardly deserves a name. This is true for Aristotle and Thomas as it is for Hegel and Kant, as it is for Rand and Rawls.
Then, is rational choice philosophy simply those three theses that Mccumber ascribes to it in his article: ontological clarity, epistemological certainty, and ethical egoism/wealth-mongering. If thisis what it means, then I think we've enough evidence to say Mccumber is right: rational choice philosophy has failed. We do not have certainty even short term. Think, for instance, of giving one's spouse flowers or some other present. We do it to be nice, but then the spouse might accuse one of cheating or doing something for which one needed to give flowers. At the every day level -- and certainly long term economic level -- rational choice philosophy does not pay out. Ontologically, there are not simple causal chains which we can pick up and choose between. This is the conceit behind the recent movie Limitless. The character has a 4-digit IQ which allows him to figure out how the market will move. But that is fiction. Too many things can cause the same phenomena which leads to indeterminacy between choices -- all could be equally rational. Finally, we are not people who seek only wealth and power to satisfy our needs. Sometimes, wealth and power can interfere with those needs. Here Limitless, the movie, gets close to pointing it out, but in the end it buys into this conceit as well. Now, if one buys into any of those three theses, then one might stil be a rational choice theorist. If we disagree on these points, then that gives us something more to discuss, but probably not on this thread.
Then, that leaves us with the question, could rational choice philosophy be something different or more? Mccumber is as obtuse here as Hegel. He writes at one point, though, the following: "Today, governments and businesses across the globe simply assume that social reality is merely a set of individuals freely making rational choices." So, I think by rational choice philosophy he means the three theses above plus the idea that "social reality consists simply in individuals freely making rational choices." Here, a long line of thinkers would disagree: Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Hegel, Marx, Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, Joan Callahan, Carol Gilligan, Sara Ruddick, Kathleen Iannello (Decisions without hierarchy) among many others.
Why?
Simply put: we are not individual atoms bumping into each other on occasion. We are social beings -- social animals as Aristotle says -- which means that our identity (subjectivity in Foucault's philosophy) is shaped by and shapes our communities/society/traditions. Yes, I make rational decisions (I hope), but even my rationality is shaped by my culture: what I find more or less rational, what modes of reasoning are available to me, to what extent I’ve been trained to think reasonably, what forms of discourse I’ve been introduced to, etc. This fact does not make me any the less rational. Au contraire, it is the very conditions for being rational at all.
This, I take it, is the gist of MacIntyre’s theory in AV, and certainly the argument I bring to bear in Reason, Tradition, and the Good.
Comments
Milgram Experiment
21/06/11 18:34 Filed in: Human Nature
The Milgram experiment is a famous experiment conducted by Stanley Milgram to study obedience in the 1960's. The study involved three people: a "doctor" or person conducting the experiment, a "answerer" or someone who was supposed to answer questions, and the "questioner." The questioner was the real study of the subject, as both the doctor and the answerer were actors. The questioner watched as the doctor locked the questioner into restraining straps and hooked electrodes to the person. Then, the doctor took the questioner into a separate room. The questioner was instructed to apply increasing levels of shock to the answerer if the answerer failed to ask a question. The doctor gave stock replies to any question the questioner ask. The questioner could leave at any time but was told "the experiment must go on."
The question: to what extent would individuals, living in a modern industrial democracy, shock people at the directions of an authority figure?
You can see the experiment on youtube. As it turned out, 65% of people increased the shock to fatal levels even over the screams and protests of the person being shocked.
Why did some people obey the "doctor" and why did others resist?
What does the Milgram experiment tell us about human nature? Or does it say something instead about modern society?
What, exactly, can we expect to gain from studying ethics and moral theory?
NB: if you are a Marylhurst student, please make sure your name shows on the comments section so I can record the participation.
The question: to what extent would individuals, living in a modern industrial democracy, shock people at the directions of an authority figure?
You can see the experiment on youtube. As it turned out, 65% of people increased the shock to fatal levels even over the screams and protests of the person being shocked.
Why did some people obey the "doctor" and why did others resist?
What does the Milgram experiment tell us about human nature? Or does it say something instead about modern society?
What, exactly, can we expect to gain from studying ethics and moral theory?
NB: if you are a Marylhurst student, please make sure your name shows on the comments section so I can record the participation.
Agency and Needs
09/06/11 19:48 Filed in: Human Nature | social justice
"A theory of human needs constitutes the foundation of a critical theory of society the end of which is the greatest expansion of the human person in a given concrete historical situation."
I wrote that sentence as part of a book proposal which I am working on. My book concerns human nature, particularly human nature as the foundation of a just society. It will be the backbone of a natural law theory and a critical politics based on that natural law theory. Human needs provides the contours for exploring those ethical and political issues. Any "right" we might have must be based, in some part, on how it satisfies or serves some human need.
The question that arises, that's been plaguing me, is, What is the relationship between these human needs and agency? I'm asking about agency because, in contemporary culture, both evolutionary psychology and social constructivism threaten agency. They threaten agency by either denying it and embracing some form of determinism (we are determined either by our biology or by our culture) or sharply curtail it. So one need that appears clear in the modern situation is a need for a better understanding of agency so that society can be more structured to enhance agency.
Thus, my original sentence points to the link between a theory of human needs and a theory of human agency. The greatest expansion of the human person in a given concrete historical situation concerns, essentially, the expansion of the person's agency in that historical situation. The needs and the agency mutually determine each other given the biological and sociological constraints that the individual finds herself in. That is, a theory of human needs presents the conditions for the exercise of agency, which means we must understand what kind of beings human beings are: biological-cultural beings.
I wrote that sentence as part of a book proposal which I am working on. My book concerns human nature, particularly human nature as the foundation of a just society. It will be the backbone of a natural law theory and a critical politics based on that natural law theory. Human needs provides the contours for exploring those ethical and political issues. Any "right" we might have must be based, in some part, on how it satisfies or serves some human need.
The question that arises, that's been plaguing me, is, What is the relationship between these human needs and agency? I'm asking about agency because, in contemporary culture, both evolutionary psychology and social constructivism threaten agency. They threaten agency by either denying it and embracing some form of determinism (we are determined either by our biology or by our culture) or sharply curtail it. So one need that appears clear in the modern situation is a need for a better understanding of agency so that society can be more structured to enhance agency.
Thus, my original sentence points to the link between a theory of human needs and a theory of human agency. The greatest expansion of the human person in a given concrete historical situation concerns, essentially, the expansion of the person's agency in that historical situation. The needs and the agency mutually determine each other given the biological and sociological constraints that the individual finds herself in. That is, a theory of human needs presents the conditions for the exercise of agency, which means we must understand what kind of beings human beings are: biological-cultural beings.
Dawkins' Fair Share
07/06/11 19:55 Filed in: Human Nature
"But, as we have already seen, some individuals are better life insurance risks than others. An under-sized runt bears just as many of his mother's genes as his more thriving litter mates. But his life expectation is less. Another way to put this point is that he needs more than his fair share."
-- Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 125
Dawkins claims in his book that he is not setting out to make moral or political claims. He is simply trying to explain the biology of selfishness and altruism. He claims that his argument shows that seemingly altruistic behavior arises as a way for selfish genes to propogate themselves, insuring the survival of the genes.
In reading his book, however, we comes across passages like the above. Note the last sentence: the individual runt needs more than his fair share. In the context of biology, what counts as a fair share here? Why even use the term "fair" which is laden with various moral and political meanings? Would it not be better to write something like, "He needs more than what would be evenly proportioned between him and his siblings"? By using the term "fair share" here, Dawkins has, intentionally or not, introduced moral claims into the science he is presenting.
This example does not stand alone in the book. The very use of the term "selfish" has a lot of moral and political meaning behind it, despite Dawkins' claims to the contrary.
The more general point, however, is that science cannot be separated from morality (nor vice versa), and that science occurs within a system of shared understandings that include moral choices. This point is exactly the one Thomas Kuhn made with his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The point does not mean that science is not an attempt to find the truth. Rather, it shows that our attempts to get at the truth may always be limited and will always have presumptions that we need to examine carefully so we know exactly what truth we are believing in. That is both a scientific and a moral point.
-- Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 125
Dawkins claims in his book that he is not setting out to make moral or political claims. He is simply trying to explain the biology of selfishness and altruism. He claims that his argument shows that seemingly altruistic behavior arises as a way for selfish genes to propogate themselves, insuring the survival of the genes.
In reading his book, however, we comes across passages like the above. Note the last sentence: the individual runt needs more than his fair share. In the context of biology, what counts as a fair share here? Why even use the term "fair" which is laden with various moral and political meanings? Would it not be better to write something like, "He needs more than what would be evenly proportioned between him and his siblings"? By using the term "fair share" here, Dawkins has, intentionally or not, introduced moral claims into the science he is presenting.
This example does not stand alone in the book. The very use of the term "selfish" has a lot of moral and political meaning behind it, despite Dawkins' claims to the contrary.
The more general point, however, is that science cannot be separated from morality (nor vice versa), and that science occurs within a system of shared understandings that include moral choices. This point is exactly the one Thomas Kuhn made with his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The point does not mean that science is not an attempt to find the truth. Rather, it shows that our attempts to get at the truth may always be limited and will always have presumptions that we need to examine carefully so we know exactly what truth we are believing in. That is both a scientific and a moral point.
Selfish Gene Mythology
06/06/11 17:46 Filed in: Human Nature
Richard Dawkins published The Selfish Gene back in 1976, and since then, over a million copies have been sold. Dawkins defends the idea that the unit of evolution, of natural selection, is, not the the group or the individual life-form, but the gene. Genes perpetuate themselves and do everything they can to secure their survival, and he calls such behavior selfish. The idea here is that genes compete against rivals and do what they can to make sure that they survive which often means that their rivals do not survive.
What I want to point out in this post is that Dawkins made a particular choice. He chose to use the word selfish to describe the activities of his genes, and that choice tells us two things. First, he tell us that Dawkins prioritized some types of behaviors over others in picking out his unit of natural selection and, second, that Dawkins thought it was "selfishness" is important for Dawkins.
We can easily question the first issue. For Dawkins, what is important is that some entities survive and some do not, that those two types of entities are rivals, or in competition, and that the ones who survive act to preserve themselves at all costs. This account presents what Mary Midgley rightly calls a mythology. The mythology of selfishness of genes, that nature is "red in tooth and claw" and that all of life is about "survival of the fittest" has proven very influential in the modern world, as evidenced both by the number of sales that Dawkins' book generated and also by the spin-off of Dawkins' work in the form of evolutionary psychology. What myths do is take facts and try to present an over-arching story about those facts.
Dawkins has done this for facts about evolution and about survival.
The thing about myths is that they often ignore experience that does not agree with the over-arching mythology and rests on points that it tries to sweep under the carpet. To wit, Dawkins divides the world into selfish entities and altruistic entities. Yet, he completely ignores cooperation. In fact, Dawkins' genes are able to create "survival machines" only because they cooperate with each other to produce such an entity. To explain this in terms of selfish acts/behaviors/choices masks something because cooperation need not be, and often is not, selfish in origin.
This point should give us a pause in how we understand, not only Dawkins' work and popularity, but how we understand evolution and science. We often think of science as "just the facts, ma'am." In fact, however, science, just like every other aspect of life, comes with a slant, which does not mean it isn't true. Just the opposite. But we need to be aware both of that slant and how the slant of science can skew our vision of the world and what we expect from it.
What I want to point out in this post is that Dawkins made a particular choice. He chose to use the word selfish to describe the activities of his genes, and that choice tells us two things. First, he tell us that Dawkins prioritized some types of behaviors over others in picking out his unit of natural selection and, second, that Dawkins thought it was "selfishness" is important for Dawkins.
We can easily question the first issue. For Dawkins, what is important is that some entities survive and some do not, that those two types of entities are rivals, or in competition, and that the ones who survive act to preserve themselves at all costs. This account presents what Mary Midgley rightly calls a mythology. The mythology of selfishness of genes, that nature is "red in tooth and claw" and that all of life is about "survival of the fittest" has proven very influential in the modern world, as evidenced both by the number of sales that Dawkins' book generated and also by the spin-off of Dawkins' work in the form of evolutionary psychology. What myths do is take facts and try to present an over-arching story about those facts.
Dawkins has done this for facts about evolution and about survival.
The thing about myths is that they often ignore experience that does not agree with the over-arching mythology and rests on points that it tries to sweep under the carpet. To wit, Dawkins divides the world into selfish entities and altruistic entities. Yet, he completely ignores cooperation. In fact, Dawkins' genes are able to create "survival machines" only because they cooperate with each other to produce such an entity. To explain this in terms of selfish acts/behaviors/choices masks something because cooperation need not be, and often is not, selfish in origin.
This point should give us a pause in how we understand, not only Dawkins' work and popularity, but how we understand evolution and science. We often think of science as "just the facts, ma'am." In fact, however, science, just like every other aspect of life, comes with a slant, which does not mean it isn't true. Just the opposite. But we need to be aware both of that slant and how the slant of science can skew our vision of the world and what we expect from it.