Evolution of Responsibility part 2
11/07/11 23:35 Filed in: Human Nature
This post is the second of three on the evolution of responsibility and free will. In the first post, I discussed the difficulty in trying to find a conception or even agreement about determinism and free will among Evolutionary Psychologists. In short, however, it appears that EP embraces a determinism of genes-culture mix. In other words, materialists are determinists. Yet, despite being determinists, both Dawkins and Richards imply that, in some sense, human beings are “in control” of their actions. What this control entails or means remains mysterious.
In this post, I want to look more specifically at the issue of “culpability” as a product of evolution. I will examine M&M’s (Martin Daly and Margo Wilson) account of culpability as presented in chapter 11 of their oft-cited Homicide. The questions that arise include, How does culpability arise as a cultural practice without language? Has culpability been around long enough to become an ESS?
In their Homicide, M&M provide what Robert Wright calls one of the clearest discussions of determinism and free will. Every human culture and human being has a concept of right- and wrong-doing, which testifies that “moral sensibility is a cross-culturally universal aspect of human nature” (254). That is, moral sensibility is in our genes, not just our culture. We must, then, understand how moral sensibility comprises a “means to the end of fitness in the social environments in which we evolved.”
Now, if moral sensibility makes homo sapiens more fit over their evolutionary history, then moral sensibility must provide some benefit to the actors who express it. That is, generally speaking we should expect that what survives as a genetic trait does not cause the particular individual an early death and does, in some minor way, increase the reproductive success of individuals of a particular species. For M&M, this benefit “depends upon shared interests, as a result either of kinship or of cooperative reciprocity” (255). In short, denying one’s self at the present moment might prove beneficial to one’s future success, as, say, being honest now can “make one an attractive exchange partner.” Thus, feelings of “justice” or “wronged” result from evolved mechanisms that provide some advantage to individuals of the species for reproductive success.
M&M take this basic understanding of the EP approach to moral sensibility and turn it to a discussion of “paying a debt” by the wrongdoer. Someone who commits a crime must compensate for that crime. Culpability, then, “reflects the offender’s debt to the victim” (257). Culpability, however, links to issues of provocation. Groups of people must inquire into the extent to which the victim antagonized the victimizer or to what extent the victimizing act proves unintended. Provocation evolved as both a moral and psychological theory. “It proposed both that provocation justifies retaliatory action and that it causes such action” (257). Following this line of thought, we understand the most culpable persons to have acted willfully or with malicious choice in a free act (261). After a discussion of the insanity defense and other cultural issues, M&M write, “To both ordinary people and to jurists, ‘responsibility’ entails the choice of one’s actions and the capacity to have done otherwise” (264). Of course, according to M&M, everyone understands, despite the black and white pictures drawn by theorists and the courts, that blameworthiness or culpability occurs on a continuum with free will, and everyone faces “diminished responsibility” in most acts. Generally, however, they insist that people conflate causal and moral judgments. Regardless of whether people are scientifically understood to be determined, moral culpability may play some role in the direction of society or the modification of individual’s behavior (e.g. through the threat of punishment or the promise of rewards). Thus, M&M refuse to take a side in the free will debate. They end their discussion returning to the fact of the benefit of the notion of “culpability” to human reproductive success. They note, for instance, studies that show close relatives often receive lighter punishment for harm to family members because they’ve already suffered enough. In short, it is unfortunate and irrational for someone to harm another with whom s/he shares a significant amount of genes. Further, capital punishment, as opposed to reparations, can be seen as a feature of modern nation states that have replaced the more kinship account of justice with a rational, emotionless system of punishment.
In general, M&M provide an interesting account of “culpability” and moral sensibility from the perspective of evolution and EP. As animals, human beings evolved with certain needs and imperatives, just like other animals. The possibility for moral sensibility cannot be seen as something imposed from above by some “spiritual nature” whether our own or another’s (God, for instance). To make such a claim denies the role of emotions and motivations in human actions. Their resistance to taking a position on “free will,” however, proves baffling and limited, and a characteristic (as seen in the last post) of those associated with EP. One wonders if EP theorists are fearful of writing about the denial of free will, like Darwin before them who refused to write about human evolution in the Origin of Species due to what he knew would be a fierce backlash.
Given that, however, I think we can still ask intelligent questions about M&M’s account. Most importantly, how does the notion of “culpability” arise? Is it possible to have a notion of “culpability” without language? And what of this moral sensibility? We are, it is often said, the only animals with morality. Of course, we know relatively little about our nearest relatives, all of whom are extinct – homo neanderthalis, homo ergastor, homo habilis. What we do know suggests that even beings as advanced as Neanderthal lacked language ability. If Neanderthal did, in fact, bury their dead, it suggests they may have experienced some proto-moral sensibility.
Still, we do know that our living closest relatives – chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas – engage in social behavior just as we do. Does the behavior of two alpha males contending for dominance of a gorilla harem constitute a proto-moral sensibility? Could the sexual actions of female bonobos to reconcile or diffuse male malevolence constitute a form of moral action? Even if it did, it’s not clear how such minimalist moralities could have given rise to the notion of culpability.
If the notion of “culpability” is essential to the moral sensibility that M&M suggest increases human reproductive success, then we return once more to the issue of language. Could the notion play any role without language? If so, how? Where are our naturalistic models of this behavior/notion/sensibility? If not, then the EP is left with a more trying question. EP theorists are characterized by their thesis that human behavior evolved during our evolution in the Pleistocene era on the savannas of Africa. In particular, many of our behaviors are well suited for smaller hunter-gatherer communities of early hominid life than they are for city living or even for agricultural life. They insist, then, that homo sapiens have not been around long enough to evolve psychological mechanisms that would be better adapted to agricultural, close-community, larger population living. Yet, language appeared on the scene during this time period. It is too late, according to EP’s own arguments, for language to have led to the development of a notion of culpability that would prove evolutionarily significant or promote human reproductive success, particularly for all human beings (what they refer to as an ESS – evolutionary stable strategy).
So far, I’ve found no one who addresses these questions, much less attempts to answer them. I am convinced that we cannot explain our moral sensibility from primarily a purely theological or dualistic perspective. We are material beings who obey the laws of (non-reductive) physics. That means, we had to have bodies suited to the particular life-form we express, including our moral sensibilities. There is, then, something peculiarly odd about the EP approach to moral sensibility, culpability, and free will. Part of this lies in what I will address in my next post: a misunderstanding of what, exactly, free will is.
In this post, I want to look more specifically at the issue of “culpability” as a product of evolution. I will examine M&M’s (Martin Daly and Margo Wilson) account of culpability as presented in chapter 11 of their oft-cited Homicide. The questions that arise include, How does culpability arise as a cultural practice without language? Has culpability been around long enough to become an ESS?
In their Homicide, M&M provide what Robert Wright calls one of the clearest discussions of determinism and free will. Every human culture and human being has a concept of right- and wrong-doing, which testifies that “moral sensibility is a cross-culturally universal aspect of human nature” (254). That is, moral sensibility is in our genes, not just our culture. We must, then, understand how moral sensibility comprises a “means to the end of fitness in the social environments in which we evolved.”
Now, if moral sensibility makes homo sapiens more fit over their evolutionary history, then moral sensibility must provide some benefit to the actors who express it. That is, generally speaking we should expect that what survives as a genetic trait does not cause the particular individual an early death and does, in some minor way, increase the reproductive success of individuals of a particular species. For M&M, this benefit “depends upon shared interests, as a result either of kinship or of cooperative reciprocity” (255). In short, denying one’s self at the present moment might prove beneficial to one’s future success, as, say, being honest now can “make one an attractive exchange partner.” Thus, feelings of “justice” or “wronged” result from evolved mechanisms that provide some advantage to individuals of the species for reproductive success.
M&M take this basic understanding of the EP approach to moral sensibility and turn it to a discussion of “paying a debt” by the wrongdoer. Someone who commits a crime must compensate for that crime. Culpability, then, “reflects the offender’s debt to the victim” (257). Culpability, however, links to issues of provocation. Groups of people must inquire into the extent to which the victim antagonized the victimizer or to what extent the victimizing act proves unintended. Provocation evolved as both a moral and psychological theory. “It proposed both that provocation justifies retaliatory action and that it causes such action” (257). Following this line of thought, we understand the most culpable persons to have acted willfully or with malicious choice in a free act (261). After a discussion of the insanity defense and other cultural issues, M&M write, “To both ordinary people and to jurists, ‘responsibility’ entails the choice of one’s actions and the capacity to have done otherwise” (264). Of course, according to M&M, everyone understands, despite the black and white pictures drawn by theorists and the courts, that blameworthiness or culpability occurs on a continuum with free will, and everyone faces “diminished responsibility” in most acts. Generally, however, they insist that people conflate causal and moral judgments. Regardless of whether people are scientifically understood to be determined, moral culpability may play some role in the direction of society or the modification of individual’s behavior (e.g. through the threat of punishment or the promise of rewards). Thus, M&M refuse to take a side in the free will debate. They end their discussion returning to the fact of the benefit of the notion of “culpability” to human reproductive success. They note, for instance, studies that show close relatives often receive lighter punishment for harm to family members because they’ve already suffered enough. In short, it is unfortunate and irrational for someone to harm another with whom s/he shares a significant amount of genes. Further, capital punishment, as opposed to reparations, can be seen as a feature of modern nation states that have replaced the more kinship account of justice with a rational, emotionless system of punishment.
In general, M&M provide an interesting account of “culpability” and moral sensibility from the perspective of evolution and EP. As animals, human beings evolved with certain needs and imperatives, just like other animals. The possibility for moral sensibility cannot be seen as something imposed from above by some “spiritual nature” whether our own or another’s (God, for instance). To make such a claim denies the role of emotions and motivations in human actions. Their resistance to taking a position on “free will,” however, proves baffling and limited, and a characteristic (as seen in the last post) of those associated with EP. One wonders if EP theorists are fearful of writing about the denial of free will, like Darwin before them who refused to write about human evolution in the Origin of Species due to what he knew would be a fierce backlash.
Given that, however, I think we can still ask intelligent questions about M&M’s account. Most importantly, how does the notion of “culpability” arise? Is it possible to have a notion of “culpability” without language? And what of this moral sensibility? We are, it is often said, the only animals with morality. Of course, we know relatively little about our nearest relatives, all of whom are extinct – homo neanderthalis, homo ergastor, homo habilis. What we do know suggests that even beings as advanced as Neanderthal lacked language ability. If Neanderthal did, in fact, bury their dead, it suggests they may have experienced some proto-moral sensibility.
Still, we do know that our living closest relatives – chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas – engage in social behavior just as we do. Does the behavior of two alpha males contending for dominance of a gorilla harem constitute a proto-moral sensibility? Could the sexual actions of female bonobos to reconcile or diffuse male malevolence constitute a form of moral action? Even if it did, it’s not clear how such minimalist moralities could have given rise to the notion of culpability.
If the notion of “culpability” is essential to the moral sensibility that M&M suggest increases human reproductive success, then we return once more to the issue of language. Could the notion play any role without language? If so, how? Where are our naturalistic models of this behavior/notion/sensibility? If not, then the EP is left with a more trying question. EP theorists are characterized by their thesis that human behavior evolved during our evolution in the Pleistocene era on the savannas of Africa. In particular, many of our behaviors are well suited for smaller hunter-gatherer communities of early hominid life than they are for city living or even for agricultural life. They insist, then, that homo sapiens have not been around long enough to evolve psychological mechanisms that would be better adapted to agricultural, close-community, larger population living. Yet, language appeared on the scene during this time period. It is too late, according to EP’s own arguments, for language to have led to the development of a notion of culpability that would prove evolutionarily significant or promote human reproductive success, particularly for all human beings (what they refer to as an ESS – evolutionary stable strategy).
So far, I’ve found no one who addresses these questions, much less attempts to answer them. I am convinced that we cannot explain our moral sensibility from primarily a purely theological or dualistic perspective. We are material beings who obey the laws of (non-reductive) physics. That means, we had to have bodies suited to the particular life-form we express, including our moral sensibilities. There is, then, something peculiarly odd about the EP approach to moral sensibility, culpability, and free will. Part of this lies in what I will address in my next post: a misunderstanding of what, exactly, free will is.
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